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Abstract.
This paper analyzes the effects of international openness on vertical
integration decisions. A simple model is presented to represent the
asset specificity problem at the heart of many industrial
organization economists' analysis of vertical integration. It
suggests that there is a kind of negative externality conferred by
each vertical integration, by 'thinning' the market for inputs and
thus worsening opportunism problems; thus, in equilibrium there
tends to be too much of it. Further, vertical integration features a
kind of strategic complementarity, which can lead to multiple
equilibria in the outsourcing decision, thus providing a theory of
different 'industrial systems' or 'industrial cultures' in ex ante
identical countries. In addition, the country that gets stuck in a
highly vertically integrated equilibrium suffers from lower
efficiency. Greater international openness forces convergence in
the degree of outsourcing across countries, and facilitates leaner,
less integrated firms, thus providing a channel for welfare
improvements from international openness that appears to be quite
different from those that are familiar from the trade theory
literature. This may be taken as one theory of 'outsourcing,'
'downsizing' and 'Japanization' as consequences of 'globalization.'
Much of topical economics implicitly or explicitly concerns changes in vertical integration
decisions of industrial corporations. For example, the phenomenon of 'downsizing' often has a
strong element of vertical divestiture1. Strong trends in 'outsourcing2' have been observed in
recent years in many industrial sectors3. The differences in industrial 'systems' across countries,
for example, between the U.S. and Japanese economies, have much to do with differences in
vertical structure, with Japanese industry very much less integrated than its major trading
partners4.
All of these trends in vertical structure are at times claimed by various observers to have
a strong relationship with international trade. Downsizing is held to be a response to increased
foreign competition; the leaner organizational structure of Japanese industry allegedly gives it
some advantages which have forced a partial 'Japanization' of some Western industries5.
However, the logic in each case is far from clear, and there does not appear to be a body of
'This was driven home emphatically by the brake workers' strike that crippled General
Motors this past spring; the principal issue was GM's desire to outsource more of its brake
production.
throughout this paper, the term 'outsourcing' will mean the provision of an input outside
of the firm that will use it, not necessarily outside of the country in which it will be used.
This appears to be a difference in usage between the industrial organization and trade theory
literatures.
3See Gardner (1991) for the rise in outsourcing of data management by hospitals; Bank
Systems & Technology (1991) on outsourcing of technology by banks; Buxbaum (1994) on
the recent outsourcing of distribution services by GM; Bamford (1994) on the recent trend
toward outsourcing of parts in the U.S. automotive sector; Bardi and Tracey (1991) on the
move toward greater outsourcing of transport services across manufacturing; and Economist
(1991) for an overview of the trend toward outsourcing in manufacturing in general.
4See Nishiguchi (1994) for an extensive analysis of the Japanese case; Morris (1991) and
Gertler (1991) offer comparisons with North American industry. See also Economist (1991).
Similar comments are sometimes made about small-firm industrialization in the 'Third Italy'
of Emilia-Romagna and other regions; see Gertler (1991, pp. 380-5) for a review.
5See, for example, Gertler (1991).
2theory within international economics to address these questions. Can a rise in openness affect
the vertical structure of industry in a predictable way? If a 'leaner' organizational structure really
is a lower cost way of procuring inputs6, why would, say, an American auto firm wait until it is
battered by competitors to implement it? Why would a profit-maximizing corporation not always
choose to minimize costs? Further, does any of this have welfare implications?
This paper analyzes the effects of international openness on the vertical integration
decision in an industry equilibrium, and suggests that openness can indeed have strong effects
on vertical structure, and that this can have large welfare effects. A simple model is presented
to represent the asset specificity problem at the heart of many industrial organization economists'
analysis of vertical integration. It suggests that there is a kind of negative externality conferred
by each vertical integration, by thinning the independent market; thus, in equilibrium there tends
to be too much of it. This can lead to multiple equilibria in the outsourcing decision, thus
providing a theory of different 'industrial systems' or 'industrial cultures' in ex ante identical
countries despite profit maximizing behaviour. Nonetheless, globalization forces convergence in
the degree of outsourcing across countries, and there is a presumption that it results in less
vertical integration, thus providing a role for welfare improvements for international openness that
appears to be quite different from those that are familiar from the trade theory literature.
The outlines of the argument are as follows. In this model, each of a number of final
goods producers ('downstream firms,' or DSF's) tries to procure a specialized, indivisible input
from a supplier (or 'upstream firm,' or USF). Each USF can produce one unit of specialized
6As argued forcefully by, among many others, Nishiguchi (1994) and Economist (1991).
See also the recent consultant's report on the US auto industry cited in Maynard (1996),
which pushed outsourcing very hard.
3input. There are two possible procurement methods: 'arm's length,' or market, procurement; and
'integrated' procurement. In the former, the two firms form an understanding, perhaps through
a verbal agreement, and come to terms on payment when the unit is ready. In the latter, some
costly commitment technology is brought to bear, either a long-term contract or a merger between
the two enterprises. This dichotomy is, of course, meant to capture some of the key issues in
choosing the degree of vertical integration; in practice there is a continuum of such degrees
available.
Because of the sunkeness of the cost of producing the input and its specialized nature, the
USF knows that under the arm's length arrangement it is in danger of being 'held up' by the DSF
and not recouping its costs ex post. Its only reassurance is that there may be alternative uses for
the input beyond the DSF for which it is intended, which will give the USF bargaining power
and allow it to demand a remunerative price. Thus, in the absence of a robust potential market
for the input, the USF may judge the input to be an unremunerative product and abandon it. The
alternative is the integrative arrangement, but this has its own disadvantages; either legal costs
from negotiating and enforcing a contract or the costs of a merger and its attendant heightened
'governance costs.'
Thus, as argued in an extensive literature, each DSF/USF pair in the industry chooses
between the two methods by trading off the 'hold-up' problem of arm's length trade against the
'governance costs' of the integrated solution7. However, three consequences of this reasoning
are noted which are not much acknowledged in the existing literature. First, the feasibility of the
arm's length system depends on the USF's prospects for recovering its sunk costs on the open
7This language is most closely associated with Willamson (1971, 1989).
4market; but these prospects are better the more of the other firms have chosen arm's length
arrangements (or, the 'thicker' is the secondary market). The reason is that the equilibrium price
received by an unintegrated supplier is determined by the input's most attractive alternative use,
and the expected value of this is higher, the more alternative uses there are8. Since an
unintegrated DSF is much more likely than an integrated one to be a potential alternative use for
inputs from independent suppliers, it is thus natural that a rise in the number of unintegrated
firms makes unintegrated supply more remunerative. This is Proposition 6 of the paper. There
is thus a negative externality from vertical integration, making arm's length arrangements less
feasible for others. For this same reason there is a 'strategic complementarity' in the vertical
integration decision9, so if the firms in the industry are sufficiently similar, there can be two
equilibria: one with each firm choosing integration, and the other with all input suppliers
remaining independent. One interpretation of this is that two otherwise identical countries can
have completely different 'industrial cultures' or 'industrial systems' without in any way
departing from strict assumptions of economic rationality or profit mazimization.
Second, an additional means of thickening the secondary market is to open up the
economy to international trade. If two countries have similar industries facing the 'hold-up'
problems described above, then lowering trade costs between them will make it easier for an
input supplier to find an attractive alternative buyer abroad, thus strengthening its bargaining
8Put differently, an input's price is determined by the second order-statistic of a finite
sample; raising the sample size clearly raises its expected value.
9This sort of effect might also be present in the seminal analysis of Hart and Moore
(1990) if only there was not an efficient industry-wide ownership contract worked out at time
zero. In the present paper, ownership arrangements are worked out only bilaterally.
5power ex post and making an arm's length arrangement more attractive. Thus, international trade
can in principle lead to a substantial increase in the incidence of arm's length trade. Further,
procurement systems across countries will tend to 'converge' with increased openness. There is,
in addition, a sense in which increases in arm's length trade tend to be 'internationally
contagious'.
Third, since a thickening of the market simply gives each firm more options in its
procurement strategy, the effects of the opening up of trade on vertical structure are
unambiguously efficiency enhancing. They thus provide an avenue for efficiency benefits of
open trade that are completely separate from the well-understood avenues of increased
specialization and competition, and which seem to be completely unacknowledged in the trade
theory literature.
This paper builds on a well-established tradition in industrial organization which has not
been put to much use in trade theory. The 'transactions cost' approach to vertical integration has
been espoused by Williamson (1971, 1989) and Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978). Although
it is by no means the only important theory of vertical integration (see Perry (1989) for a survey),
it has been shown to have a certain empirical explanatory power, as for example in Joskow
(1987), Monteverde and Teece (1982), and Masten (1984), each of whom shows that in the data
examined a greater level of 'integration' is predicted by a greater degree of asset specificity10.
The incentive effects of different ownership structures in the context of specific investments and
10In the former study, which examines relationships between electric utilities and coal
suppliers, the degree of integration is measured by the length of contract between the two
firms. The second study looks at the make/buy decision among U.S. automobile producers,
and the third in the aerospace industry.
6incomplete contracts are studied in Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and
Bolton and Whinston (1993). Vertical integration emerges in some cases as the best response
to the incentive problem. In the international trade literature, Spencer and Jones (1991, 1992)
study the effects of vertical integration on strategic trade policy, without endogenizing the vertical
integration decision.
Despite the richness of the literature on which it draws, the model used here has a number
of novel features. It combines a simple formulation of the idea of technological serendipity with
the finiteness of the set of firms in a given sector to provide a meaningful sense of the 'thickness'
of a market11. It allows for endogenous choice of the degree of asset specificity by input
providers, a decision which is affected by the integration decision and which in turn has its own
effect on secondary market 'thickness.' In combining these elements, the model further shows
how vertical integration by one pair of firms can confer a negative externality on the rest of the
sector, thus pointing out that the analysis of the bargaining problem carried out by a number of
pairs of firms in an industry can be qualitatively different from the analysis of a single pair of
firms in isolation12. Although the model is itself quite special, these features in some form are
likely to survive a number of kinds of generalization; this is discussed at the end.
Section 2 sets up the model; section 3 studies the determination of prices on the
nThis concept of 'thickness' has a close relationship to the concept used by Telser (1981)
to identify the advantages of organized futures markets.
12Another paper that focusses on horizontal interactions between firms in vertical
integration decisions is Bolton and Whinston (1993). That model is built with two DSF's and
one USF, and a random capacity for the USF so that the issue of 'supply assurance' plays a
key role. A different kind of negative externality from vertical integration emerges in that
case: The expected profit of the DSF left out of the arrangement falls, because it makes the
integrated firm very aggressive in non-contractible investment.
7independent market; section 4 derives equilibrium in the case of symmetric firms ('utter
homogeneity'), which tends to give corner solutions; section 5 studies the case in which the firms
are different enough that interior solutions are possible (the case of 'wide diversity'). Section
6 considers some alternative approaches.
2. The Model.
First we sketch the closed-economy version of the model; the open-economy version will
then be straightforward. Consider an economy with an 'industrial' sector composed of n firms
producing differentiated products, and an 'agricultural' sector, producing a homogeneous good
under perfect competition. Suppose that all consumers have utility function13 of the form
V(x]? x2,..., xn) + y, where x, denotes consumption of the ith 'industrial' good and y denotes
consumption of the 'agricultural' good. The latter is the numeraire, and is produced with
Ricardian technology with a marginal product of labor equal to unity, so that the wage is always
unity as well. Each industrial good is produced with a fixed labor requirement and a constant
marginal labor requirement; entry into that sector is prohibitively costly. Bertrand pricing
determines the price and gross profit of each of the n firms; because of the separability of
demand, these profits will be unaffected by any change in aggregate wealth.
Each firm in the industrial sector can reduce its fixed costs to some degree by procuring
13We will assume that the agents in the model maximize expected utility in cases in
which there is a decision to be made under uncertainty. Given that, the form of the utility
function implies risk neutrality with respect to income.
a specialized input14. These inputs can be tailor-made for the firm by entrepreneurs, who require
K>0 units of labor to design and produce one unit of specialized input. This process takes two
periods: The cost is incurred, irreversibly, in period 1, and the output is obtained in period 2.
Call the input maker an upstream firm ('USF') and the firm interested in purchasing the input
a 'downstream firm' ('DSF'). Each DSF can make use of at most one unit of specialized input,
and each USF can produce only one unit.
Because of the lag between the costs and the output, the USF needs some
reassurance that it will be paid remuneratively. To focus on the choice of organization forms,
we assume that third-party verification problems preclude the possibility of purely contractual
solutions15; see the discussion below. This leaves two possible solutions. The first is the
'integrated solution,' in which the two partners form a merger; this would involve internal
'governance' costs, denoted L. We will denote the integrated firm resulting from the merger of
USF, and DSF, as IF,. Under the second solution, the USF simply produces the unit and
anticipates bringing it to open the market, hoping to fetch a high enough price ex post to recoup
its costs. This we will call the 'unintegrated' or 'arm's length' solution16, the use of an
14It would be natural to allow such inputs to affect marginal costs as well, but the
resulting price effects would be a tremendous source of additional complication, and are not
necessary to get to the main points of the paper. Further, it would open up the possibility of
vertical integration for the purpose of 'vertical foreclosure', a motive very different from the
transactions cost motive that is the focus here. This is the subject of Hart and Tirole (1990),
Ordover, et. al. (1990), and, in the international context, Spencer and Jones (1991).
15This is simply to keep the options for each firm pair down to two. A similar analysis
could be performed with contracts as an additional option, provided that there were limitations
or costs associated with them so that contractual solutions were not always optimal.
16The term is being used quite narrowly here. For a much richer conception of what
arm's length relationships mean, see Cremer (1996).
9'independent supplier,' or simply the 'market' solution.
'Governance' costs, or more broadly, managerial incentive costs of integration, are widely
discussed in the economics literature17. We will have nothing new whatsoever to say about them
here. For a particularly simple and extreme way of making them concrete, suppose that
production of an input requires a U-asset and U-manager; production of the final good sold to
consumers requires a D-asset and a D-manager. There are actions a U-manager needs to take
from time to time to ensure that the asset will be useful, and there are actions a D-manager needs
to take from time to time to ensure that the downstream operation will be profitable. Call these
actions 'managerial care'. Suppose that the quality of the input is not verifiable to a third party,
hence not contractible; thus, it is not feasible to write a contract conditioned on the delivery of
a useful input18. Suppose that 'managerial care' is unobservable to anyone but the manager, and
hence not contractible; further, it involves some effort and consequently some disutility to the
manager. Thus, these actions will not be performed unless the manager owns the asset, and so
each asset must be managed by its owner19. In the case of a merger, this implies that the same
manager is managing two assets. We assume that there are diminishing returns to managerial
attention, so that this causes an increase in fixed costs equal to L>0 if one asset is a U-asset and
the other is a D-asset, and M>0 if they are both D-assets. We further assume that M is large
17See Williamson (1971, 1989) for extensive treatments; Calvo and Wellisz (1978) for a
formal model; Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) for treatments including
this sort of incentive effect as part of a more general class.
18This precludes a simple contractual solution such as Noldeke and Schmidt (1995).
Complicated contractual revelation mechanisms such as in Rogerson (1992) may still be
possible, but for our purposes we will suppose that they are impractical.
19Obviously, more generally the manager could own some fraction of the equity. The
basic point is the same.
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enough that horizontal integration is never profitable, simply so that we may focus on the issue
of vertical integration.
In an initial period of bargaining, each DSF simultaneously arranges with a USF which
of these two solutions will be pursued. Under the integrated solution, the two bargain ex ante
and strike a deal, splitting the surplus net of contract costs L; the merged entity then designs and
produces the input using the expected-profit-maximizing choice of technology. Under the arms'
length solution, the two partners may meet and form a mutual understanding ex ante, perhaps
through a verbal agreement, but there is no commitment on either side. The USF decides
whether or not to advance; if it advances, it incurs the fixed cost K in period 1 and chooses the
technology strategy to follow; in period 2 it receives the output and announces that it is accepting
bids on it. The input is then sold to the high bidder, ending the game. The sequence is
illustrated in Figure 1.














Figure 1. The Sequence of Events.
two options in its design strategy: a
s t r a t e g y of ' m a x i m a l
specialization'and a strategy of
'flexibility.' In the maximal
specialization strategy, the input is
designed in such close accordance
with the peculiarities of the production process of the DSF in question that it would be useless
for any other purpose. Define the cost reduction offered by the input designed for DSF i, when




strategy of maximal specialization, K1} = 0 if i^j. We normalize R,, in this case to unity. On the
other hand, the design process could allow more room for the input to be compatible with other
systems; since those other systems are likely to be less familiar to the USF, its uses with those
systems are more likely to have a serendipitous nature20 than the gains from the specialized
technology strategy. These specialization decisions could be interpreted, for example, as
choosing the degree of 'site specificity'21 or 'design specificity'22, to use Williamsonian terms.
This is incorporated into the model as follows.
20This implies a sort of uncertainty that can be extremely important in practice, especially
in new or rapidly developing technologies. In a rapidly changing technological environment,
the relative merits of alternative designs typically can not be identified at the design stage.
Examples of ex ante uncertainty of this sort are legion; see Vincenti (1994) for an account of
uncertainty in the 1930's about whether retractable landing gear or various alternatives would
prove superior, and Numagami (1996) for an account of similar uncertainty in the 1970's
about which design for digital watches would prevail.
21This is specificity resulting from physical proximity. For example, a coal-burning
electric utility may become very specialized to a particular mine by locating close to the mine
mouth; utilities have a wide variety of choice in such location decisions (Joskow, 1987). In
the aerospace industry, there are large cost savings to be had by locating the computerized
lathe for boring nose cones near the assembly plant in which the cones will be used; but once
the lathe has been installed, it is extremely costly to move it. Thus, the location of the lathe
is an important determinant of its specialization toward a particular assembler (Masten, 1984).
22This is specificity resulting from the design process per se. For example, a software
designer may write a program to fit the peculiarities of a single firm's business, or may
design it for the mass market as packaged software; the vast majority of the output of
Japanese software houses fits the former category, and is never sold on an open market, in
sharp contrast to the American system (Baba, et. al, 1995). For another example, Melton
Truck lines provides customized shipping services for Butler Manufacturing, which assembles
pre-fab buildings for Wal-Mart in Mexico. The shipping jobs are complex and involve much
coordination of different components and of border paperwork. Melton had a computerized
system for this purpose, but it went the extra step of redesigning its own information
management system to integrate it with Butler's system and provide a more effective service
(Buxbaum, 1996). A notorious example of endogenously chosen asset specificity is the case
of IBM in the 1970's redesigning its mainframe computer interfaces to make it difficult for
non-IBM hard drives to be used with them (Brock, 1989).
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Let the probability density function for R14 under the flexible technology strategy be given
by h:[0, 1]-»R, with jx h(x)dx > K. Let g:[0, l]x[0, 1]-»R be a non-negative valued function
satisfying:
(i) j ; g(y; x)dy M V x e [0, 1];
(ii) g(y; x) > 0 for x, y e [0, 1] with y<x;
(iii) g(y; x) = 0 otherwise.
Thus, g is the probability density function, conditional on a variable x, for a random variable y
on [0, 1] whose value never exceeds x. Now, if a USF has designed an input for DSF i, and has
used the flexible technology strategy, we can speak of the ex post 'suitability' of the input for
use with DSF j as measured by a random variable xtJ e [0, 1], where a value of 1 means complete
suitability and a value of zero means complete unsuitability, and where xt = (xn, xl2, ..., xm) has
a density function \y given by:
\j/(x,) = h(xu) n^gCxiji xn).
Thus, the input is always most suitable for its intended use, but it may happen to have other uses
that are almost as suitable. These suitabilities are realized as soon as the input is produced, and
at that moment they become known to all.
This input then can offer potential cost reductions to the various DSF's as follows:
13
if i*j
where (^  e [0, 1] is an exogenous constant. Thus, the greatest possible cost reduction is to its
intended DSF; this cost reduction is less than would it would have been under maximal
specialization23; but if (^  is not too small, the potential cost reductions for other DSF's might still
be substantial. The parameter ((), can be called USF i's "scope for flexibility." If it is close to
zero, there is not much the USF can do to allow for alternative uses for its product. It will be
a convenient parameter to vary in what follows.
An important consequence of these assumptions (particularly (iii) above) is that for either
technology strategy:
(1) RJJ > Ry with probability 1 for all i, where j^i .
In short, under an arm's length arrangement, a USF designs an input, choosing specialized
or flexible technology; once it is ready, the USF brings it to the market and sells it; after that,
the game ends.
In the case of the open economy, there will be two countries which will be identical in
every way. There will thus be 2n firms; those numbered 1 through n will be in country I and
the following n will be in country II. The density function given above for the 'suitabilities' of
23It would not change anything of interest to allow Rh under maximal specialization to be
random as well, provided that it was greater in expectation than Ru under flexibility.
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the n firms in one country will extend in the same way to the 'suitabilities' for the other
country's firms as well. In order to focus on the vertical structure aspects of the situation and
to make the point that the effects of openness in this model have nothing to do with well-
understood effects through product-market competition, assume that the n final goods produced
in each country are unattractive to consumers in the other, so that the final goods are effectively
nontraded. Inputs, on the other hand, can be traded across the border at a cost of t. Thus, if i<n
and j>n, for an input i, RtJ = {^x-t} if it is designed with flexible technology, and R^  = -t if it
is maximally specialized. Apart from these changes, the open-economy version of the model
works in the same way as the closed-economy version.
3. Ex post price determination.
To solve the model, we work backward from the determination of prices and input
allocations on the open market. For the moment assume a closed economy.
Once the n inputs have been produced, the matrix of R^  values is known, and the various
DSF's can send bids (simultaneously) to the various input makers. Let bX] denote the bid made
by buyer i for input j (for the moment allowing for the possibility that either firm i or firm j is
integrated24; an integrated firm always have the option of selling its input or of placing a bid for
another firm's input). The bids are made simultaneously and each represents a commitment to
buy the stated input at the stated price, provided the seller accepts the bid. It will be convenient
to define the vector of winning bids P by P, = max^b^}, which can also be called the vector of
24But not both; it would be meaningless for an integrated firm to bid for its own input.
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equilibrium prices. Without loss of generality we restrict bids to be non-negative. In addition,
since there is no meaningful difference between a bid of zero and no bid, we will without loss
of generality require each potential buyer to place a bid of at least zero each input (except for
an integrated firm's own good). Note that there is no contradiction between the impracticality
of an ex ante contract to buy and the desirability of an ex post commitment to buy. Since quality
is not contractible, an ex ante purchase contract would guarantee receipt of a worthless asset, by
removing the incentive of the U-manager to take proper managerial care, as discussed above.
However, once the input has been produced, that is not an issue.
Ignoring for parsimony costs incurred at earlier stages of the game, the payoff to an
unintegrated DSFj is given by the maximum of RJt for jeS(i), minus S^^by, where S(i) is the
set of bids made by i that were accepted by the respective sellers. (Recall that i can make use
of at most one unit of the input.) The payoff to an unintegrated USFj is equal to max^by}; the
USF simply accepts the high bid, perhaps randomizing over ties. The payoff to an integrated
firm IFj is the maximum of: max (R,,, max^^R^}) minus XjgsQ i^j (which it receives if IFX does
not accept a bid for its own asset); and maxjeS(l){Rjl}+maxk{bki} minus Xjgs^ by (which it receives
if it does).
To eliminate some technical nuisances, assume that the bids must be made in discrete
units of currency; thus, for some 8>0, all bids must be an integer multiple of £. The symbol [x]~
will denote max{y| y is an integer multiple of £, and y<x}. We will be interested only in what
happens as e becomes small. It is very important to keep in mind that the difference between
Pb the winning bid for any good, and the second-highest bid for that good, can never exceed e
in a Nash equilibrium.
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We will be interested in Nash equilibria of this bidding game, in order to discuss subgame
perfect equilibria of the full game. Propositions 1 through 5 provide a characterization. The first
point to note about these Nash equilibria is that their outcome is ex post efficient.
Proposition 1. In any Nash equilibrium of the bidding game, with probability 1, if e is small
enough, no IF sells its input, and each independently produced input is sold to its originally
intended buyer.
Proof. Suppose that in some equilibrium this is not so. In that case, denote z(i) as the input
finally used by buyer i. In no Nash equilibrium will any buyer buy more than one input, or any
input go unused, so the function z is invertible. Set M = {i | z(i)^i}? and note that z(M) = M.
If jeM, then buyer j chooses to purchase input z(j) rather than j ; if j is unintegrated, she could
have purchased j for P3+e, so we must have:
R J J " P J " £ ~ Rz(j)rPZG)-
If j eM is integrated, she has sold input j for a price of P, instead of using it herself, so:
Kfi * RZ0)rPz0)+Pr o r
RJJ~PJ - RzG)j~Pz(j)-
Thus, if we denote by n the number of independent firms in M, we must have:
Since M = z(M), this implies:
17
^jeML^-iiJ"ne — 2ijeM[Rz0)jJ = ^jsML-^-j z(j)L
where the last equality follows from the invertibility of z. From (1), as e becomes small this
must become false. QED.
This considerably simplifies the problem. It allows us to write the condition for a Nash
equilibrium as the condition that for each i and j , buyer j prefers to buy the input designed for
her at price Pj rather than outbid buyer i for input i:
R^-Pj > Rij-Pi-e for all i25,
which implies:
(2) Pi > max] {maxOVRa+Pj, 0)}-e.
Since it shows that integrated firms will not engage in any purchase or sale in the market
stage, Proposition 1 also implies an immediate corollary:
Proposition 2. In a subgame perfect equilibrium, any integrated firm will choose the maximally
specialized technology.
25If j is integrated, this condition is unchanged. The payoff from keeping input j is R ;^
the payoff from selling it and buying another is PJ-(P1+e)+Rlj. The latter must not exceed the
former, and this is the stated inequality.
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Any other choice would reduce EfRJ without having any other effect on IF,'s profits.
We obtain a further characteristic of equilibrium by eliminating weakly dominated strategies from
the strategy set, thus leaving only 'perfect' equilibria. In the context of this bidding game, this
set of strategies includes any bid by any buyer i for any input j such that bij>Rji, since lowering
such a bid to [RJ2]" will either raise i's profit or have no effect. Focussing on equilibria satisfying
this refinement immediately tells us that if good i is maximally specialized, b^O for j^ i , since
then Ry= 0 for j*i . Thus:
Proposition 3. As £->0, the equilibrium price of any maximally specialized good in a perfect
equilibrium goes to zero. In particular, in any perfect equilibrium of the full game, the
equilibrium price of any input produced by an integrated firm goes to zero.
It is therefore obvious that an unintegrated supplier would never choose the maximally
specialized technology. As a consequence of Propositions 2 and 3, we see that an input is
produced with flexible technology if and only if it is produced by an unintegrated supplier. There
is an exact correspondence between ownership structure and technology choice.
These conditions narrow the outcomes quite a bit; however, there are in general multiple
equilibria of the bidding game even after eliminating weakly dominated strategies. As an
illustration, consider the case in which n = 2, no firm is integrated, input 1 would offer 10 units
of cost reduction to DSFj and 9 to DSF2, and input 2 would offer 5 units of cost reduction to
DSFj but 7 to DSF2. Suppose that all integers are divisible by £. The bidding game here has
a range of perfect equilibria. One example is: [bn, b12, b21, b22] = [9, 5-e, 9-e, 5]; each DSF bids
19
for the other's designated input just e below the gross cost reduction that input would give her,
and for her own designated input the minimum bid required to acquire it, £ plus the competing
bid26. We might call this the 'high-price' equilibrium. By contrast, [2+e, 0, 2, e] is also an
equilibrium for the same benefit matrix. We might call this the 'low-price' equilibrium. We
need to make some sort of equilibrium selection, since the difference in payoffs between these
two is enormous.
Here the selection will be based on the following odd feature of the high-price
equilibrium. Consider DSFj's profit on its successful bid for input 1, valued at 1, compared with
its profit should its losing bid for input 2 be accepted instead. That hypothetical profit would be
(5 - [5-eJ) = e. Clearly, it would strictly prefer to lose its bid for good 2. Similarly, DSF2 earns
(7 -5) = 2 on its winning bid for input 2, but would earn £ on its bid for input 1 if that were
accepted instead, and so DSF2 strictly prefers to lose its bid for good 1. The natural question is:
Why, then, would it place that bid? Of course, in equilibrium it does not matter, since it does
lose the bid after all, but it seems to be a weak reed to support a high-price equilibrium solely
with losing bids placed by firms that would have no interest in winning them. By contrast, in
the low-price equilibrium, DSF2 makes a profit of (7-£) on its winning bid, and would make a
profit of 7 on its losing bid for input 1 if that were accepted instead; DSFj strictly prefers to win
its own input and does not bid anything for the other input. We will restrict attention to
equilibria in which the only non-zero losing bids a firm ever places are bids that would be at
26It is easy to check that this is a Nash equilibrium. DSFj buys input 1 at a price of 9,
receiving a profit of (10-9) = 1; the best alternative move would be to buy input 2 instead, for
which the lowest price would be 5+£. This would give a profit of -£, so the deviation would
be unprofitable. Analogous reasoning for DSF2 shows that its bid is optimal given DSFj's.
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least as profitable as its winning bid, in the odd event that that bid were accepted instead. This
is summarized by requiring that for any buyer j and input i, either:
or bji = 0. We might call this the "only desirable bids" (ODB) condition. It can be written this
way:
bji < max (Ry-R.+b^, 0) = max (R1J-RJJ+PJ, 0),
so that
(3) ^ = bH < max^bjiJ+e < maXj {max (R^
Putting this together with the Nash equilibrium condition (2) tells us that in the limit as £—>0,
any ODB equilibrium price vector P can be written as27:
(4) P = TR(P),
where for any benefit matrix R, TR() is an operator on R£ such that for any n-vector q, the i01
component of TR(q) is:
[TR(q)L = maXj {max (R1J-RJJ+qJ, 0)}.
27From this point on, we will look only at the limit as e—>0, so this qualification should be
understood in the statement of all subsequent propositions.
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Equation (4) has a simple intuitive meaning. The term R -^Ry+Pj can be read as the most
that buyer j would be willing to pay for input i, given that the price of input j is P r If R^Ry,
input i would do a better job for buyer j than j ' s own custom-made input, and j would be willing
to bid more for it as a result.
Note that there is no contradiction between the fact that R^  > R^  whenever i^j and the
possibility that Ry might exceed Rjr The distinction between the two is much like the difference
between absolute and comparative advantage. The statement that Ru > R^  for all firms implies
that the most efficient allocation of inputs is to place each one in the DSF for which it was
designed, and is much like saying that each input's comparative advantage is with its intended
use. However, the statement that Ry > R^  means that disregarding its opportunity cost, input i
would produce a larger benefit to DSF3 than the input designed for DSFJ5 and is much like saying
that input i has an absolute advantage over input j in serving DSFr This is what might give USF1
a possibility to enjoy a remunerative price: the higher its input's absolute advantage in use j , the
more buyer j will be eager to bid for it, even in the low-price equilibrium. Figure 2 illustrates
a case in which each of three firms' tailor-made inputs has a comparative advantage in use for
that firm, but input 3 has an absolute
advantage in all of them. This distinction is
key to the logic of the model: The workings
of the bidding game can be summarized by
suggesting that comparative advantage
determines the allocation of inputs, but
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Figure 2. A Sample Pattern of Cost Reductions.
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of income.
Equation (4) further tells us that in any ODB equilibrium, the price of any good, if it is
not zero, is determined by a 'chain of absolute advantage.' More precisely, for an equilibrium
price vector P and for any i, define A,(i; P) = argmax^, {R-R^+Pj} if this maximum is non-
negative28, and set X(i; P) = i otherwise. We can say that X(i; P) then identifies the 'runner-up
bidder' for input i in equilibrium, with A,(i; P) = i if and only if Pt = 0. We then have:
Proposition 4. For any good i in any ODB equilibrium with price vector P, with probability 1,
either P, = 0 or there is an integer k<n such that if we define z(l) = i; z(2) = X(i; P);
z(3) = X,(z(2); P), and so on, then:
(i) Pz(k) = 0, but Pz(m)> 0 for m<k;
(ii) z(m) ^ z(m') if m < m'< k; and
( i l l ) P j — 2 i m = i;..jk-lL
In other words, the price of good i is found up by adding of a sum of absolute advantages along
a chain of runner-up bidders until we hit a buyer whose own input bears a zero price.
Proof: See Appendix.
The way this works in the above simple numerical example is clear. There, even though
28The j so defined will be unique with probability 1, so we will treat it as unique here.
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DSF2 can obtain its own designated input virtually for free, it still is interested in bidding for
input 1, since that input offers an absolute advantage of (9-7) = 2 in use by DSF2. Thus, DSF2
bids 2 for that other input. This is what forces DSFj to bid slightly above 2 for input 1. At the
same time, since good 2 offers no absolute advantage to DSF1? DSFj bids nothing for it. This
is what allows DSF2 to get it for free.
Finally, it is not difficult to show that the equilibrium can be simply calculated:
Proposition 5. There is a unique ODB equilibrium, and it is given by P = [TR]nl(0), where 0
is a vector of n zeroes, and [TR]nl denotes application of the TR operator n-1 times in succession.
Proof: See Appendix.
The ODB equilibrium has attractive properties aside from those mentioned above29, but
for the sake of robustness the consequences of making a different equilibrium selection will be
discussed in section 6.
Now we can discuss the equilibria of the full model. We do this under two contrasting
assumptions about the way the scope for flexibility differs across firms; first, the assumption that
it does not vary at all (the case of 'utter homogeneity'), and then the assumption that it varies
29For example, it can be shown using results from Giil and Stacchetti (1996) that it is
equal to the marginal social value vector for the various inputs, in the sense that if P is the
ODB price vector, and if an additional copy of input i was added to the system (so that now
there are n+1 inputs for n uses); and if the enhanced set of inputs were reallocated in a
socially optimal way, the increase in social surplus that would result is P^ This is intuitive:
The extra copy of input i would go to the use in which it would generate the greatest social
cost savings, X(i, P); there it would reduce gross costs by R: ^ 1:P) -R^1;P} ^ 1;P )5 and liberate
input X(i; P) for other uses; this input would then be moved to ^2(i; P), where it is most
needed, and so on.
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greatly, in a sense to be made precise later (the case of 'wide diversity').
4. Industry Equilibrium: The case of utter homogeneity.
Suppose that (^  takes on the same value for all i, and denote this common value by (j).
An equilibrium can be constructed by working backward from the bidding game. For the
moment assume a closed economy.
It has already been noted that if in the initial bargaining an integrated solution is selected,
the maximally specialized technology strategy will be pursued, otherwise flexible technology will
be used if the input is produced at all. Let F denote the set of USF's using flexible technology,
and also the set of DSF's using independent suppliers. Note further that no firm will enter a non-
zero bid for an integrated firm's input; and if j is integrated, (Ry-R^+Pj) = (R^-l+O) < 0, so that
an integrated firm will not enter a non-zero bid for any other firm's input. Thus, P4 = 0 for any
integrated firm's input, and the prices of the non-integrated firm's input is affected only by the
presence of the other non-integrated firms. Under utter homogeneity, this means that we can
write:
, nF) ^ E[PJ,
for any non-integrated firm i, where F is the set of non-integrated (hence, flexible-technology)
firms, nF is the number of firms in this set, and the expectation is taken with respect to the
realizations of the random xXJ from which the benefit matrix is derived. The dependence of u on
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nF is the sense in which the 'thickness' of the independent market for inputs matters.
Proposition 6. The function u is increasing in nF.
Proof: It is sufficient to compare the case in which firm n is integrated with the case in which
it is unintegrated. Thus, consider two cost matrices, R and R'. Suppose that R1J = R^ except
that Rnn= 1; Rnj= 0 if j^n; l>R^n>R^>0 for j^n. Then it is easy to confirm through element-by-
element comparisons that: (i) TR,(0)>TR(0); (ii) if q'>q, then TR,(q')>TR(q); and therefore
(iii) if [TR,]k(0)>[TR]k(0), then [TR,]k+1(0)>[TR]k+1(0). Using Proposition 5, the rest is then just
induction. QED.
This is the key to the argument of the paper. It may seem curious that a rise in nF,
effectively the addition of one buyer and one seller to the open market, should lead to a rise in
the expected prices of the various inputs. The explanation is that the price of an input is
determined by the most attractive alternative use, because that determines what the value of the
runner-up bid will be. Adding one more buyer and one more seller may either result in a new
bid for an existing input that is higher than the incumbent bids, thus raising the equilibrium price
of that input; or have no effect. There is no way it can lower the price of an input. This may
be illustrated with an extension of the earlier numerical example. Suppose that to that system
of two independent inputs, we add a third, and that the three offer cost reductions as in the
following table:
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The equilibrium prices are now (2, 0, 0). The prices of the incumbent goods have not
changed, because the new good does not have an absolute advantage in any other use, nor do the
incumbent inputs have an absolute advantage in good 3. However, if R33 had turned out to be
2 instead of 4, input 2 would have an absolute advantage in use 3 given by (3-2) = 1. Thus,
DSF3 would place a bid of 1 for input 2. This would push the price of input 2 up, at the same
time raising 2's bid for input 1, since with input 2 now more expensive, input 1 is now even
more attractive to DSF2. DSF2's bid for 1 goes up to (Ri2-R22+P2) = (9-7+1) = 3. Thus, the new
price vector is (3, 1, 0). The example illustrates how adding to the independent market is a kind
of one-sided bet to the incumbent sellers: If the new independent buyer turns out to be
uninterested in the incumbents, it makes no difference to them, but if it turns out to be interested,
it pushes their prices up — possibly through a cascading chain reaction along the chain of
absolute advantage30.
30-3The importance of 'serendipity,' in the form of ex ante uncertainty about the Ry's should
by now be clear. If, for a given choice of technology, we removed the uncertainty and
replaced the elements of the benefit matrix with their ex ante means (so that RH = jx h(x)dx =
p and Rjj = \y g(y; x)h(x)dx dy = G for flexible firms), then no flexible input would offer an
absolute advantage in any alternative use (since p>cr), and so no flexibly produced input
would ever have a positive price. In this sense, uncertainty about the outcome of
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The arm's length method will produce an input for DSF, provided that USF, expects to
receive a high enough price ex post to recoup its sunk costs, or in other words, if u((|>, nF) > K
will hold with ie F. Since u is increasing in nF, for a given value of ((), this will clearly be true
provided that nF exceeds some threshold n with ieF, defined by n = min { m | u{(|), m)>K }.
Thus, in the initial bargaining between USF, and DSF1? if (n-1) or more other firms are expected
to use arm's length arrangements, it will be feasible for DSFX to use an arm's length arrangement
as well. Otherwise, the only procurement option will be integration.
If the two firms integrate, the net cost reduction will be R^-L-K = 1 -L-K because the
integrated entity will use the maximally specialized technology. The net cost reduction from
arm's length trade will be E[xlt]-K. There is clearly a trade-off between the two: The integrated
solution allows for the greatest technological cost reduction (since E f x ^ l ) , but imposes
additional 'governance' costs L. Since integration is always an option, if the former outweighs
the latter, there is nothing to discuss: We will always observe integration. The problem becomes
interesting only if this is not so, and so we assume:
(Al) 1-E[xu] < L.
Thus, if it is feasible, the surplus from arm's length trade will always exceed the surplus from
integration, and an arm's length arrangement will be the outcome of ex ante negotiations.
We can now speak of a Nash equilibrium in vertical structure. For any pair of firms i,
if n-1 other pairs are expected to use an arm's length arrangement, i will do so as well; but if
technological development is what makes non-integrated production possible.
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fewer than n-1 are expected to integrate, i will integrate. It is immediate that this implies that
the only possible equilibria are nF= 0 and nF= n: complete integration of the sector and universal
use of independent suppliers.
Proposition 7. In a small closed economy (n<n) with utter homogeneity of firms, the only
equilibrium is complete vertical integration. In a large economy (n>n), there are two equilibria:
Complete integration and universal use of independent suppliers.
This highlights a point about the transactions-cost approach that does not appear to be
widely acknowledged: It implies a kind of strategic complementarity in integration decisions.
A larger number of firms using independent supply implies a wider use of flexible technology,
hence a thicker secondary market, and thus makes it more attractive for any given firm to use
independent supply. An immediate consequence is that two otherwise identical economies in
isolation from each other can evolve completely different 'industrial systems' or 'industrial
cultures', one strictly more efficient than the other. This outcome bears a resemblance to
descriptions of national differences in sourcing strategies and particularly the contrast between
the highly integrated 'fordist' model of Western economies and the striking predominance of
outsourcing in Japanese industry as compared to other economies, which many observers appear
to regard as an inherently more efficient sourcing system (for example, Nishiguchi (1994), Gertler
(1991), and The Economist (1991)). In addition, it carries with it the implication that despite this
inefficiency of the integrated outcome, no single firm in the vertically integrated economy would
wish to switch procurement methods: The secondary market would be too thin to make it
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practical.
The open economy version of this model is then straightforward to analyze. We must
now write the unintegrated USF's expected revenue as u(<j>, t, nF, n r) , where nF, is the number
of unintegrated firms in the other country, to take account of the fact that R^  is a decreasing
function of t if i<n and j>n or vice versa. The parameter 't' could be either a tariff or transport
costs, or possibly extra transactions costs imposed by cross-border regulation. Whatever the
interpretation, we will call 'globalization' a reduction in 't,' where the initial value will be taken
as a sufficiently high value that in effect the two economies act as if closed. If we define an
economy as 'small', 'medium' or 'large' depending on whether n<n/2, n/2<n<n, or n>n, then it
is clear that for two small economies, globalization will have no effect on vertical structure (since
whatever value t takes, the only equilibrium will be integration). However, in the other two cases
it can have significant effects:
Proposition 8. In the case of utter homogeneity of firms, a sufficient globalization between
medium-sized countries will make the more efficient arm's length equilibrium possible in both
economies. It would not be possible in either economy without globalization.
Clearly, if t falls by enough, the above reasoning for the closed economy case will apply
to the combined economies of the two countries. Thus, the finding that the only equilibria
involved all firms acting in the same way applies as well:
Proposition 9. Whatever the size of the economies concerned, in the case of utter homogeneity
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of firms, with a sufficient globalization any equilibrium will involve complete convergence of
the vertical structure of the two economies.
5. Industry Equilibrium: The case of wide diversity.
The above homogeneity assumption ought not to be taken too literally, since in practice
it certainly is not true that every single business enterprise within an industry in a given country
does business in exactly the same way. The reason is plausibly that there are some ex ante
differences between firms, for example in their scope for flexibility. Thus, suppose that within
each country each firm has a different value for (j^ . Let the firms in each country be ordered in
descending order of §{. Again, begin with the closed economy case. We can write the expected
payoff of an unintegrated supplier i as:
, F) = E[PJ.
This time, naturally, the ex ante payoff can differ between firms, and further not only the number
but also the identities of the firms in the unintegrated set F will matter. Not surprisingly, the
expected revenues of an unintegrated firm with a large scope for flexibility will be greater, ceteris
paribus, than those for a firm with less flexibility. This can be seen by considering two firms,
i and j , with (^  = fy initially, and noting how their payoffs change with an increase in ((>,.
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Proposition 10. If i, j e F and i^j, then:
^i!>^>o.
Proof: See Appendix.
Because the payoff to a higher ^ independent USF will be greater than that of a lower
(j), USF, in any Nash equilibrium pattern of vertical structure, F must be composed of an unbroken
sequence of firms from i=l up to and including a threshold firm, say fi, with u((j)fi, {I,-, fi}) > K
but u((j>fi+1, {1,-, n+1}) < K. If u*(i) = n(<j)p {1,..., i}) is a strictly decreasing function of i, there
is only one such fi, and hence one equilibrium. This will clearly be so if (^  falls sufficiently fast
in i; here we assume that it does.
In the open economy case, USFj's expected revenue can be written
u ^ , t, (l,...n), {l,...n'}), where fi' is the number of unintegrated firms in country II. For any t
and n', we can find the value of ii consistent with equilibrium in country I. This gives a kind
of country I 'reaction function' (abusing the term somewhat, since each firm pair in country I acts
independently). Since a rise in n' shifts the function u up, this 'reaction function' necessarily
slopes upward. Once again, strategic complementarity is in evidence in integration decisions.
The same argument works for country II, and the two 'reaction functions' can be combined to
find the equilibrium number of independent suppliers (fi, n') in the two countries. This is
demonstrated in Figure 3, under the assumption:
(A2) u((^ 1+1; {!,..., i+l}, {n+1,..., n+i'+l}) < u ^ ; {!,..., i},
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for all i, i'<n. This is the meaning of the assumption of 'wide diversity' between business firms.
It implies that u ^ , {1,..., i+1}, {n+1,..., n}) slopes downward in i, but further that each country's
'reaction function' never has a slope exceeding unity. This is equivalent to so-called 'stability
assumptions' in simple oligopoly models.
Globalization unambiguously raises the incidence of independent supply in both countries,
moving the world economy from point A to point B. This leads to a welfare improvement in
both countries, because of Al.
Finally, note that under these conditions there is a sense in which outsourcing practices
are internationally 'contagious.' If country II undergoes an exogenous change in technology so
that each of its firms now has a greater scope for specialization (and so ()), goes up for each of
its firms), that will lead to a rise in its incidence of outsourcing for any given country I outcome.
This can be represented as the broken curve in Figure 3, a shift of country IPs 'reaction
function.' But this of course stimulates a greater use of outsourcing in country I, and this
reinforces the additional popularity of
outsourcing in country II. Thus, both
countries depend to a greater extent than
before on independent suppliers, with the final
outcome at point C. It should be remembered
that at no time does any trade occur between
these two countries at all: A change in
contracting behaviour in one country affects




Country I's 'reaction function.
Indedpendent suppliers in country I, n.
Figure 3: International Equilibrium Under 'Wide Diversity.'
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secondary market for inputs, thus changing bargaining power. Nonetheless, the process of
'globalization' has had substantial real effects in both countries.
6. Possible Extensions.
The object here has been to show that some simple ideas from industrial organization can
readily to brought into an international context, and offer some promise as a framework for
analyzing the relationship between international openness and vertical structure. In particular,
the central point has been the role of a rise in market 'thickness' resulting from greater openness.
To allow for greater focus on this one effect, the model has been extremely simplified. Here we
will discuss a few directions in which assumptions could be relaxed or altered.
First, there is no particular reason to cling in general to the two extremes of 'utter
homogeneity' and 'wide diversity.' Once those two cases are understood, it is straightforward
to extend the analysis to any intermediate case. The key result of strategic complementarity in
integration decisions, and the finding that the set of non-integrated firms will be the ones with
the highest values of (j),, will still hold. A case of particular interest would be the case in which
the function u*(i) = \i(fo {l,...,i}) has a value greater than K for i=l, falls below K as i rises, then
crosses K twice more as i rises to n. In this case, we have 'highly integrated' and 'highly
unintegrated' equilibria, neither of which is a corner. Thus, there is no reason in general to insist
that multiple equilibria must go hand in hand with a corner solution.
Second, although the appeal of the low-price equilibrium of the price game compared to
the other equilibria seems strong, some may be interested in the consequences of other equilibria.
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The only other one that seems at all focal is the 'high-price' equilibrium. In this equilibrium (in
the limit as £—»0), the price of input i is given by F1 = max^R^}, or, in the most naive sense,
the value of its best alternative use31. It is straightforward that this reproduces every qualitative
result, mutatis mutandis, in Propositions 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, and 10 (with the exception that a rise in
<k will now increase only the price of input i). Thus, the main economic consequences of the
analysis will be unchanged. However, note that some odd features will be present; aside from
those already mentioned, note that even integrated firms, with their maximally specialized inputs
in hand, will bid positive sums for other firm's inputs, in which they have no interest.
More broadly, one may wish to depart from the Bertrand-type price determination
structure. It may be of interest to examine Walrasian prices, for example. This turns out not to
give any greater generality, however. Because the First Welfare Theorem will be satisfied (ex
post) by such an equilibrium, the allocation of the inputs will be the same as they are in the
bidding equilibrium studied above. Further, using this fact, it is easy to show that the set of
Walrasian price vectors, and the set of price vectors supportable by Nash equilibria of the above
price game, are one and the same. Using results from Giil and Stacchetti (1996), it is easy to
show that the lowest-price Walrasian equilibrium is given by the ODB price vector studied in the
text.
It may be of interest to examine bargaining versions of the model. Perhaps the simplest
way of formulating bargaining in this setting is to allow DSF, and XJSF1 to engage in Nash
bargaining once the input is ready; if the bargaining breaks down, they walk away from the table
31This is supported as a Nash equilibrium by b1} = [RJ" if j^ i and btl = max^fyj+e. As
noted above, this involves firms making positive, but losing, bids which they strictly prefer to
lose.
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irrevocably and seek other partners; if they find willing partners, they follow Nash bargaining
with them and the game ends. The payoffs from the second (potential) stage of bargaining form
the threat point of the first stage of bargaining. The Appendix shows that this framework
provides conclusions qualitatively identical to the main ones of the text. Extensions to other
bargaining frameworks, including non-cooperative approaches, may be of some interest, as may
approaches that involve the Shapley value.
The relaxation of conditions ensuring condition (1) may be of some interest. If there is
a possibility that some input other than the one designed for DSF, has its socially most efficient
use with DSF13 then we may see 'downsizing' at some times taking the form of 'firing' one's
original input supplier (in other words, not purchasing its input). Thus, although welfare
enhancing, globalization may fail to be ex post Pareto improving. Further, in such a formulation
there would be a second interesting source of welfare benefit from market 'thickening': It would
raise the expected value of a match. In the current model, the expected surplus generated by an
equilibrium match between a USF and a DSF is always E[RJ; market thickening affects the
distribution of this surplus between the two partners, but not the level of this surplus. However,
if (1) does not hold, both effects will be at work, possibly accentuating the strategic
complementarity of integration decisions.
A further generalization that may be of some interest is the allowance for a wider set of
organizational choices. Aside from complete integration and a pure market approach,
procurement in practice involves partial equity control, quasi-integration, contracts of varying
lengths, forms, and complexities; and reputational solutions. It is speculated here that in a richer
model with some more such options specified, each with its own peculiar costs and constraints,
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we may see a tendency for a thicker market to lead to relatively less integrated forms within
partially integrated firms, as well as a reduction in the number of totally integrated firms. In
addition, it could be quite interesting to inquire how the form of optimal procurement contracts,
for that portion of firms using them, is affected by the sort of general equilibrium effects outlined
here. However, this is beyond the scope of this paper.
Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 4.
First, it is simple to see that we can find a value of k satisfying (i) and (ii). Since there
are a finite number of inputs, for k large enough (ii) must be violated; choose the largest k such
that it is not. For this k, z(j) = z(k+l) for some j<k. Suppose that j<k. Then (Pz(]), PZ(j+i>-'PZ(k))
are all strictly positive (since XQ; P) = j if and only if P- = 0). Thus, from (4),
However, since z(j) = z(k+l), this implies that Iffl=z(a,.,z(k)[Rz(ni)z(m+1)- Rz(in+i)z(m+i)] = 0. However,
this sum can be written as:
which, since z(j) = z(k+l) is negative by (1). This is a contradiction; thus, j=k. By definition
of j , this means that z(k) = z(k+l), but by construction of the z's, this means that A,(z(k); P) =
z(k). But since A,(j; P) = j if and only if Pj= 0, this implies that Pz(k) = 0. Thus, k satisfies (i)
and (ii).
Having established that, (iii) follows by mechanical application of (4). QED.
(Appendix.) 2
Proof of Proposition 5.
Proof. Claim. For any m and for any equilibrium P, P > [TR]m(0). To see this, note that P>0;
TR(q) is non-decreasing in q; and P=[TR]m(P), since P is a fixed point of T. Thus, P = [TR]m(P)
> [TR]m(0). This establishes the Claim.
Define the 'order' of input i in an equilibrium with price vector P as the smallest k such
that ?ik(i; P) has a price of zero. Thus, any input i with P, = 0 is of order zero, and any input of
order greater than zero is strictly positive. Consider all of the inputs of order 1. For any such
input i,
M = -K-i, Hi; P) " RA(i; P), X<i; P) ~*~ "x<i; P)
= Ri, /to, p) - Rx<i; P), m; P) s i n c e ^(i; p ) i s o f order zero;
= max
 k^i{Ri)k - Rkk+Pk} since P is a fixed point of T;
= max ^{Ri^ - Rkkl a fortiori, since Pk^0 for all k;
=
 [TR(0)L> where for any vector x, [x], denotes the ith component.
Thus, the price of each input of order 1 can be expressed as the corresponding component
of the vector operator T applied once to a vector of n zero prices. Similarly, if all prices of order
m can be expressed as the corresponding component of T applied m times to the zero vector, then
for any input i of order m+1, the following will hold.
(Appendix.) 3
i ~ Ri, Mi; P) " R^(i; P), MK P) + *<i; P)
max ^ { R ^ - R^ + Pk} since P is a fixed point of T;
max
 k^{Ri)k - R^ + [[TR]m(0)]k} (a fortiori, since Pk>[[TR]m(O)]k for all k by the above Claim);
Thus, the reasoning can be applied to all m by induction. Observing that
[[TR]m(0)]k=[[TR]r(0)]k for all m and r greater than or equal to the order of k, and that each input
is of order n-1 or less, completes the proof. QED.
Proof of Proposition 10.
Consider a realization of R and the price vector P that results. Holding all else constant, we may
write both as a function of (j^ : R(<|>1) and P ^ ) . Note that BR^/B^ takes a value of xkm if k =
i and m ^ i, and zero otherwise. Assume that PCc)),) is such that there exists a neigborhood S
around P ^ ) such that for all P'e S, and for any input m, A,(m; P') = A,(m; P^,)) (in other words,
there are no tying bids). This will be true with probability 1. By Proposition 4, P- will be
affected by <)>, if and only if there is a chain of runner-up bidders leading from input j to input
i, and P, > 0. Thus, if P1 = 0, dPfify = 0 and BP/Bifc = 0. If P, > 0, then by Proposition 4,
dP/d^ = Xi .^p). Further, if P>0, then BPj/BcJ), takes a value of xt^p) if there is a chain of
runner-up bidders going from j to i, and zero otherwise. Thus, if we denote by A(i, j) the set of
realized values of R such that P1 > 0 and for some m > 0, i = XmQ; P); and denote by B(i) the
set of realized values of R such that P, > 0, then:
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dE[P(] dE[Pj]
where G(R|$) is the distribution of the R matrix as a function of the vector of <j)r QED.
A Simple Bargaining Model.
Very similar results to the bidding model can come out of a simple bargaining framework.
Suppose that when an unintegrated USFa receives its output it approaches the DSF, with it. They
bargain over price; if negotiations fail, each of the two partners may chose another firm in the
sector as a potential transaction partner and begin a round of bargaining with this new partner.
If this second round of negotiations fails, the input will not be sold. In both rounds of
bargaining, the Nash bargaining solution is imposed. We additionally impose:
(A3) K > 1/2.
To see how the bargaining process works, we work backward from the last period of
potential bargaining for an unintegrated USF. Suppose that USF,'s negotiations with DSFX have
broken down and it must now seek another partner to buy its input. Assume for the moment that
it is the only USF seeking a partner, since all of the other USF's have successfully sold their
inputs in the earlier round of bargaining; this will be confirmed as part of the equilibrium.
Suppose that USFt bargains with DSFr By assumption, DSFj (as with all of the other
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DSF's) has already purchased its own tailor-made input, which gives it a cost reduction of Rjr
USFj can offer it a savings of R,r Since the DSF can use only one input, the total surplus
generated by this sale would be R -^R .^ Since if negotiations break down, the game will simply
end, the threat point for the USF is 0, but the threat point for the DSF is its status quo, R .^ This
all implies (with Nash bargaining) that a sale will occur if and only if R1J>R3J, and in that case
the payoff to USF1 is (R-R^)/^, which is also the price DSFj pays for the input. Therefore, if we
allow USFj its choice of bargaining partner, its expected revenue is:
(5) max {max
 {j} {(R^-R^/2}, 0}.
At the same time, DSF, has the option of trying to find a partner; since the other inputs
have all been sold to other DSF's, this involves bargaining with another DSF for purchase of its
input. Such a transaction would involve a surplus of R -^R^ for some j (DSFj would give up its
input and receive a cost reduction of 0 instead of RJJ5 while DSFj would receive a cost reduction
of Rjt instead of 0). From (1), this surplus would always be negative. Thus, such transactions
will never occur, and the DSF who failed to come to an agreement in the first round of
bargaining will receive a payoff of zero.
These outcomes from the second round of bargaining now form the threat points for the
first round of bargaining. When USFj bargains with DSF15 it is clear that their threat points are
given by (5) and 0 respectively1. Since the cost reduction that will occur if the transaction is
Recall that at the time of the first round of bargaining the matrix of R^'s is known with
certainty by all.
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completed is R11? the surplus from the transaction is R^ minus the value in (5); by (1), this is
always positive, so the transaction will occur. The price that USFt is paid for the input is:
(6) U + max
Thus, if we back up to the time at which the USF makes its decision as to whether or not to
proceed with the investment, we can calculate its expected revenue. Note that if the USF has
chosen maximal specialization, since Ry= 0 for j^ i , (6) takes a value of Rtl/2 < 1/2. By A3, this
is less than the cost of producing the input, so we know that the unintegrated USF would never
proceed with production of the input using the maximally specialized technology. Further, in
calculating (6) we can ignore any DSF that has chosen the maximally specialized technology,
since for such a firm R]J=1 and so R^  - RJJ<0. Thus, we restrict attention to the case of the
flexible technology strategy, in which case the expected revenue to USFt is given by:
(7) = E 2 p +
where 3> is the set of USF's who have chosen the flexible technology strategy, no is the number
of USF's in this set, and the expectation is taken with respect to the random variables x^  for je<£.
Clearly, since adding one more firm with flexible technology simply adds one more value of
(Appendix.) 1
R-Rjj to the list from which a maximum is selected, (|> is increasing in n^. Thus, Proposition 6
carries over to this bargaining model. The other propositions follow similarly.
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